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limitations did not begin to run until Stone knew the
facts giving rise to her statutory entitlement. The fact
that Stone is the daughter of Williams is the relevant
fact giving rise to Stone's statutory entitlement. Stone
discovered she was Williams daughter in October 17,
1979.
The defendants argued that since Stone did not
seek a judicial determination that she was the owner
of the copyright renewals within three years of 1979,
she is barred from asserting a cause of action based
on that ownership. Statutes of limitations bar reme-
dies, not the assertion of rights.7 This principle applies
to the Act.8 To be entitled to a share of copyright
renewal royalties under the Act, the plaintiff must be
a child of the author.9 The Act does not state that a
plaintiff loses the right to renewals by delaying asser-
tion of that right."
The court makes clear that there is a distinction
between what must be done to give rise to an entitle-
ment of a statutory right, and what needs to be done
to vindicate that right." The court concluded that
Stone did not lose her status as the author's child just
because she waited to ask the court to declare her
status. The only consequence to Stone was to limit
her claims based on the infringing acts of the defen-
dants. Royalties which became due either subsequent
to, or within three years of, the commencement of the
suit were not barred by the statute of limitations.
Stone could not, however, recover for royalties which
became due more than three years before the com-
mencement of the suit.
Finally, Stone argued the defendants' ongoing
exploitation of her interest in the copyright renewals
and their failure to account to her for her royalty
share was a continuous course of wrongful conduct
which precludes the statute of limitations defense.
The court disagreed. Although each infringement is a
separate injury which gives rise to an independent
claim for relief, when infringements occur during the
limitations period, that does not mean that recovery is
available for past infringements. 2 Stone could only
recover for the injuries occurring within three years of
the commencement of the suit.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made
clear that the three year statute of limitations govern-
ing causes of action in infringement under the Act
apply only to the individual acts of infringement, not
the enforcement of the property interest in the copy-
right renewal. Hence, a plaintiffs substantive right to
an interest in a copyright renewal is not abrogated
just because that plaintiff fails to timely file for a hold-
ing on that status. Here, the three year statute of limi-
tations under the Act began to run once Stone was
put on notice that Williams was her father in 1979.
However, each act of infringement by the defendants
was distinct, giving rise to an independent claim of
relief. Thus, Stone's claims for royalties which became
due within three years of the commencement of the
suit were not time-barred.
Barbara Fox Kraut
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Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Webster,
968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, a Video Dealers Association, brought suit
against defendant, the state of Missouri, challenging
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the distri-
bution of violent videos to minors. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the United
States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri finding the statute to be unconstitutional
under First Amendment principles.
FACTS
Plaintiffs are associations whose members rented
or sold videos to the public, an association of film
producers and distributors, and owners and operators
of video retail stores. Defendants are the Missouri
Attorney General, a county prosecuting attorney, and
all other members empowered to enforce the statute
(collectively "Missouri").
The challenged statute provides that videos cov-
ered under the statute must be displayed or main-
tained in a separate area and may not be rented or
sold to persons under the age of seventeen. The
statute applies to videos which, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the average adult person
would find" "(1)... [has] a tendency to cater to or
appeal to morbid interests in violence for persons
under the age of seventeen, (2) ...depicts violence in
a way which is patently offensive with respect to
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what is suitable for persons under the age of seven-
teen, and (3)...lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for persons under the age of seven-
teen."'
The statute contains no definition of 'violence', no
explanation of purpose, and no legislative history. In
a July 1989 article written by the bill's sponsor, the
representative wrote that the bill was designed to
cover movies containing "graphic sexual torture,
bondage, rape, cannibalism, human brutality, and
mutilation."'
Missouri's position is that the statute targets
"slasher videos," which it describes as "blood and
gore" displaying "the most bestial and graphic acts of
violence imaginable" such as "excessive scenes of
murder, rape, sado-masochistic sex, autopsies, mutila-
tions, satanism and assorted perversions." Missouri
also broadly asserts that the statute is aimed at
"graphically violent videos."'
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The court found that the statute was unconstitu-
tional for three reasons: (1) it is not narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling state interest, (2) the statute
is impermissibly vague, and (3) the statute imposes
strict liability.' Because the statute regulates videos
based on their content, the court applied strict scruti-
ny. In deciding whether a statute which is a content-
based regulation of speech should be upheld under
strict scrutiny, the court uses a two step analysis. First,
the court determines whether the regulation can be
justified with a compelling state interest and second,
the court determines whether the regulating statute is
narrowly tailored to achieve its asserted purpose.6 In
applying these factors, the court held that the statute
was not narrowly tailored to promote an articulated,
compelling state interest.
7
Under the strict scrutiny analysis, Missouri
attempted to justify its statute's content-based regula-
tion of speech by citing two compelling state inter-
ests-prohibiting obscenity and protecting children
from slasher videos. First, the court held that the
statute could not be justified as legally prohibiting
obscene material under the First Amendment, because
obscene material encompasses only expression that
depicts or describes sexual conduct.8 Although agree-
ing with Missouri that some expression which is not
obscene for adults may be obscene from the view-
point of a minor, the court still found the statute con-
stitutionally infirm because of its inclusion of violent
videos. Videos included under the statute depicting
only violence do not fall within the legal definition of
obscenity.
Second, the court found that although states have
broader authority to regulate communicative materials
available to children, minors are nevertheless entitled
to a significant measure of First Amendment free-
doms.9 Only in narrow and defined circumstances
may government bar public dissemination of protect-
ed materials to them.0 Because much of the speech
covered by the statute was neither obscene nor sub-
ject to some other legitimate proscription, it could not
be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for
them. In refusing to decide whether the state's interest
in protecting children was legitimate, the court con-
cluded its application of strict scrutiny by holding that
even assuming the state's interest is valid, the statute
was not narrowly drawn to achieve its end without
unnecessarily infringing on freedom of expression."
As drawn, the statute covered all types of violence.
To survive a vagueness challenge, the test is
whether the statute gives a person of "ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited," and whether it provides "explicit standards
for those who apply the statute.""2 Courts apply a
stringent vagueness test when the statute involved
allegedly infringes on the right of free speech.
Missouri asserted that the statute was merely an
adoption of the Miller test for obscenity, substituting
the word "violence" for the words "sexual conduct."'"
The court, however, reasoned that if the statute was
similar to the Miller test, a definition of "violence" was
required. The statute's phrase, "...tendency to cater or
appeal to morbid interests in violence for persons
under the age of seventeen" was held by the court to
be elusive and prohibitive of merely offensive videos
also."4 Furthermore, the court found that given the
absence of legislative history and purpose, there was
no way for Missouri's courts to decisively narrow the
statute. Therefore, the court concluded that because
"people of common intelligence, whether prosecutors
or video dealers, must guess at the meaning of the
statute...the statute is impermissibly vague.""
Last, the court condemned the statute for impos-
ing strict liability on video dealers. Statutes which
impose criminal responsibility for dissemination of
unprotected speech or chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights must contain a knowledge require-
ment.6 Moreover, the court felt that regardless of a
knowledge requirement, penalizing video dealers for
a video's content presented a hazard of self-censor-
ship. The court felt that dealers would in essence be
forced to view all videos to make a determination of
their content; they would be reluctant to exercise
their freedom of speech which would ultimately
restrict the market. The court held that because the
statute's strict liability requirement would make deal-
ers reluctant to place videos on the market, thereby
restricting the public's access to constitutionally pro-




Courts have repeatedly held that legislation aimed
at protecting children must be clearly drawn and the
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standards adopted must be reasonably precise. This is
necessary so that those who govern and those who
administer the laws will understand the statute's
meaning and application. In this case, the court
refused to narrowly construe the statute to cure it of
its constitutional defects. The court explained there
was no readily apparent means of rehabilitating the
statute. Nothing less than rewriting the statute to at
least include a definition of violence would begin to
remedy its vagueness. Nevertheless, the court added,
it was not belittling the State's interest in protecting
the well-being of minors, and stressed that its holding
narrowly applied to the statute at issue.
Sarah Joyce
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